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Abstract
When assessing the impact of taxation on the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages
(SSBs), most studies consider the average consumer. Individual consumption is, however,
very heterogeneous. In this paper, we propose a three-step methodology to evaluate the
impact of SSB taxation on individual consumption. First, we use a disaggregation method to
recover individual consumption from observed household consumption. Second, we estimate
a matrix of price elasticities of demand. Third, we simulate the impact of a tax policy on
individual consumption. We find high level of heterogeneity in consumption. Adults, both
men and women, consume a greater quantity of SSBs than children. For any given age
category, the average consumption of SSBs increases with body mass index. Among heavy
consumers of SSBs, obese and overweight people are over-represented. In France, a e0.20/l
tax on SSBs might decrease sugar intake (due to SSBs) by 0.8 kg per year on average and
by more than 2 kg for 5% of the adult population; the decrease being greater for an obese
adult than a normal weight adult. For children, the decrease in sugar intake is about 0.25
kg on average and greater than 0.6 kg per year for about 5% of children.
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1 Introduction
Obesity is now a worldwide public health problem. From 1975 to 2014, the age-standardized
prevalence of obesity increased from 3.2% to 10.8% in men, and from 6.4% to 14.9% in women
(NCD et al., 2016). According to Finkelstein et al. (2005), the direct and indirect costs of obesity
in the US may be as high as $139 billion in 2003 (1.2% of GDP). In France, the social cost of
overweight and obese individuals in 2012 was estimated to be as high as e20 billion (about 1%
of GDP), an amount equivalent to the social cost of tobacco (Caby, 2016). To combat the rise in
obesity, a widely advocated policy is a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs). According to
Malik et al. (2006), who conducted a review of the link between SSBs and weight gain: ‘sufficient
evidence exists for public health strategies to discourage consumption of sugary drinks as part of
a healthy lifestyle’. The taxation of SSBs is now implemented in a growing number of countries
and cities. For example, France, Hungary, Finland, and Mexico have recently implemented taxes
on SSBs (Mytton et al., 2012), a few US cities have also implemented such taxes and the UK is
looking to implement a tax in 2018.
Recent ex-post evaluations of SSB taxation suggest that consumers do react to the tax.
Thus, in Mexico, a one peso/liter excise tax, equivalent to a 10% price increase, led to a 12%
decrease in the purchase of taxed SSBs (Colchero et al., 2015). Recent results on the impact of a
tax in Berkeley (a $0.01/ounce tax, roughly a 25% tax for a 12-pack of 12 oz cans) suggest that
the purchase of taxed SSBs decreased. Silver et al. (2017) found a 10% decrease on average,
and Falbe et al. (2016) found a 21% decrease among low-income populations. Both studies also
found an increase in the consumption of non-taxed beverages, in particular, water.
Focusing on the average impact of a nutritional tax is, however, not sufficient. First, there
is evidence that consumption is highly heterogeneous. For example, Gustavsen and Rickertsen
(2011) reported that in Norway in 2001, the average SSB consumption was 61 litres per person
per year but 5% of Norwegian households had a consumption greater than 206 litres per person
per year, whereas 35% of households had an SSB consumption lower than 20 litres per person
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per year. Second, given this heterogeneity in consumption, the impact of a tax is likely to differ
greatly among the population. Using quantile regression, Gustavsen and Rickertsen (2013)
showed that taxation ‘will have the highest percentage effect among low-purchasing households
but the absolute effect is highest among high-purchasing households’. Finkelstein et al. (2013)
found similar results in the US case. They showed that the price elasticity for low consumers of
SSBs is higher (in absolute terms) than that of heavy consumers. However, because the lower
elasticity of heavy consumers applies to greater quantities, the impact of the tax on quantities
consumed is higher for heavy consumers than for low consumers. Etile´ and Sharma (2015)
reached the same conclusion in the Australian market.
However, the justification for SSB taxation relates to the negative health impact of ‘excessive’
sugar consumption which increases the risk of obesity and related negative health consequences.
Estimates by Caby (2016) suggest that the social cost of obesity increases with the degree of
obesity. Thus, in France, the annual social cost of an overweight individual is estimated at e360
and the annual social cost of an obese individual is estimated at e1,300. Most of this social
cost is an ‘internality’, that is, a cost which will be supported by the same individual in the
future, and the literature suggests that consumers do not adequately take these internalities
into account. In a context of heterogeneous consumers and internalities, Griffith et al. (2017)
show that the optimal tax rate should be defined in function of ‘the average internality plus
an adjustment based on the covariance of internalities and the (absolute value of) the slope of
demands’. The tax policy is more effective if the consumers who incur the highest internalities
are the more price responsive.
The studies that deal with the heterogeneity of consumption conclude that even if heavy
drinkers are less price responsive (than low consumers) the impact of a tax on consumption is
greater for heavy drinkers than for low consumers. However these studies do not indicate who
the heavy drinkers are: in particular, whether or not they are obese, that is, if they are likely to
suffer from ‘high’ internalities. Thus, one cannot conclude from these studies that the tax has a
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greater effect on individuals who are likely to experience higher internalities. The limits of the
existing studies relate to the data availability. Because data is mostly available at the household
level, individual purchases are frequently estimated by dividing household purchases by the size
of the household.1
Because the consequences of excessive SSB consumption on health are an individual issue,
it is important to improve the way individual consumption is estimated when the information
currently available relates to households and not to individuals within the household.2 The
objective of this paper is to assess the impact of SSB taxation on individual consumption,
distinguishing individuals according to characteristics, such as age, gender, and body mass
index (BMI). To do so, we develop a three-stage methodology. First, we use a disaggregation
method to recover individual consumption from the observed household consumption of non-
alcoholic beverages. Second, we model the household demand using a random utility approach
and estimate the price elasticities of demand. Third, using the estimated price elasticities and
the estimated individual consumption of the different SSBs, we simulate the impact of a tax
policy on individual consumption. Stages two and three are based on standard procedures,
while conversely, the first stage of the approach is original and is based on the few papers
using this method in the empirical literature. Chesher (1998) used a non-parametric method to
decompose the nutrient consumption of households into individual consumption. In his analysis,
individuals differed according to their age and gender, and households differed by per-capita
income and region of residence. Following this first study, Vasdekis and Trichopoulou (2000), and
Allais and Tressou (2009) adopted an additive non-parametric approach to recover individual
food expenditure, and individual seafood consumption, respectively. Recently, Bonnet et al.
(2014) estimated individual nutrient consumption as a function of individual BMI and other
1The size of the household is sometimes computed using coefficients to distinguish between adults and children,
but the choice of coefficients remains arbitrary.
2Wada et al. (2015) used an alternative approach: they merged the 24 hour dietary recall data from the US
National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys with data on soda prices. The data set directly provides
individual data, thus solving the problem. This has a cost, however. First, consumption is observed over a very
short period of time, which may impact the robustness of the results. Second, prices faced by each consumer are
not observed, making it difficult to estimate accurate elasticities.
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individual variables. In this paper, we follow a similar method in order to decompose the
household purchase of non-alcoholic beverages into individual purchases. We assume that in a
given household, the consumption of an individual depends on his own characteristics (gender,
age, and BMI), and on household characteristics (income, socio-professional category, region of
residence, etc.).
Whereas standard methods using household level data fail to distinguish from amongst dif-
ferent types of consumers, our analysis is able to distinguish consumers according to multiple
individual characteristics. We can therefore evaluate the impact of a policy on various types of
consumers (adults versus children, obese versus normal weight individuals, etc.), while dealing
with the heterogeneity of consumption amongst consumers.
According to our results, at-home consumption of SBBs by adults, both men and women, is
larger than that of children. In most cases, the average consumption of a beverage for a given age
category increases with BMI status. That is, overweight individuals consume more than normal
weight individuals, and obese individuals consume more than overweight individuals. We also
find that at a given age and BMI status, the consumption of regular soft drinks in the last decile
of the distribution is at least twice the average consumption, while the consumption in the last
centile is at least four times the average consumption. From the consumption of the different
beverages, we deduce the sugar intake. As is the case for SSBs, sugar intake increases with
BMI status, and adults consume more than children. On average, sugar intake from beverages
is about 5 kg per year for adults and slightly less than 2 kg per year for children. Moreover, it
is higher than 4 kg per year for 5% of children (higher than 8 kg for 1% of children) and higher
than 11 kg per year for 5% of adults (higher than 18 kg per year for 1% of adults). For adults,
such a high intake of sugar corresponds to the calorie intake required for 22 days, that is about
6% of the total calorie intake for a year. We find price elasticities of demand in the range of -2
to -3 for different beverages. Finally, we show that a e0.20/l tax on SSBs might decrease the
SSB consumption of 5% of the adult population by more than 2 kg; the decrease being greater
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for obese adults than normal weight adults. For children, the decrease in sugar consumption
is greater than 0.6 kg per year for about 5% of children. However, we do not find that obese
children are more affected than normal weight children, a conclusion that is consistent with the
findings of Bonnet et al. (2014) on the total consumption of calories. We also find that for
among heavy drinkers, overweight and obese people are over-represented.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in this study. Section
3 discusses the different stages of the methodology. Section 4 provides the results of the esti-
mated individual consumptions, price elasticities, and the impact of a tax policy on individual
consumption. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data on SSB purchases of households
We use the 2011 data from a French representative consumer panel data of 27,291 households
collected by KANTAR Worldpanel, a home-scan data set providing detailed information on
at-home purchases of non-alcoholic beverages. For each purchase, the data set provides char-
acteristics of the good (e.g., brand, type of sweetener used), the quantity purchased and the
expenditure. The data set also provides information on households, such as the socio-economic
status, as well as the age, gender and BMI of each person within the household. Because bever-
ages are mainly non-perishable products which can be stored for several months (except for some
varieties of fruit juice), we assume there is no loss, implying that consumption and purchase is
equal.3 Finally, note that at-home consumption represents about 75% of the total consumption
of these products for adults and children.4
3Because we analyze yearly consumption, changes in inventory play a minor role.
4INCA2 (“Etude Individuelle Nationale des Consommations Alimentaires 2006”) study
https://www.anses.fr/fr/system/files/PASER-Ra-INCA2.pdf
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The market of non-alcoholic beverages includes soft drinks (SDs), fruit juice, nectar, and
bottled water.5 SDs include colas, iced tea, flavored water, and an aggregate of other soft drinks
(tonic, lemonade, and fruit drinks). We exclude drinking milk from the non-alcoholic market,
as econometric analysis of the French market suggests that substitutions between milk and non-
alcoholic beverages are small (Allais et al., 2010). As a consequence, the market is composed of
six groups of products (the four SDs, nectar, and fruit juice) plus bottled water. For SDs, we
distinguish the regular version (which contains added sugar) from the diet version (which does
not contain added sugar). In the following, we will refer to seven product categories, that are
regular colas, regular iced tea, regular flavored water, other regular soft drinks, diet SDs, nectar,
and fruit juice.6 Finally, we define SSBs as regular SDs and nectar as they contain added
sugar. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for consumption and price. First, a significant
proportion of households do not purchase any SSBs (29%) or any regular SDs (32%). Obviously
the percentage of non-purchasers for the sub-categories is higher (e.g., about 50% of households
do not purchase regular colas). Table 1 provides the average per-capita consumption, on the
basis of households who consume rather than on the total population.7 The average consumption
(for those who consume) of regular SDs is 35 litres per person per year, which is relatively low
compared to the reported level of consumption in some other countries. For example, Etile´ and
Sharma (2015) report a 90 litres per year at-home consumption of SDs in Australia. The average
consumption of diet SDs is 26 litres per person per year, greater than the average consumption
of fruit juice and nectar (about 20 litres per person per year). Because we are interested in
the intake of sugar due to beverage consumption, we compute the added sugar consumption
and the total sugar consumption using the average sugar content of beverages provided in the
fourth column of Table 1. For those who consume SSBs (about 70% of consumers), the average
5The fruit juice category aggregates pure fruit juice (60% of purchases), and juice prepared with fruit pure´e
(40%). We assume that fruit juice does not contain added sugar.
6In the descriptive analysis, we distinguish the four diet SDs. However, due to the number of observations, to
estimate individual consumption, we consider an aggregate of diet SDs.
7The per-capita consumption is the household consumption divided by the number of persons in the household
without weighting consumption for the different individuals.
8
intake of added sugar is 3.4 kg per person per year. For those consuming SSBs or fruit juice
(about 75% of consumers), the average intake of sugar from beverages is estimated at 4.6 kg per
person per year. In comparison, Han and Powell (2013) report an annual intake of sugar from
SSBs greater than 20 kg per year in the US.8 Finally, as shown by the standard deviation, the
per-capita consumption is highly heterogenous.
Table 1 also provides information on the prices of the ten reported product categories (four
regular SDs, four diet SDs, nectar, and fruit juice). Prices are computed using observed prices
(unit-value) of 60 products purchased from six different retailers. The 60 products are sold under
40 different brands, as some brands are common to different product categories (e.g., regular
colas and diet colas). For each category, we compute a monthly average price as the weighted
average, using market shares as weights, of the price of all purchases from all retailers of all
products in each category. Prices differ between categories, with fruit juice, nectar, and other
SDs being the most expensive products. There is no clear ranking between the prices of the diet
versions of a product compared to the regular ones. For example, diet cola is less expensive than
regular cola but diet iced tea is more expensive than regular iced tea. It should be acknowledged
that these prices are average prices for each category. As shown by the standard deviations,
within a category, there is some heterogeneity in price. This heterogeneity arises mainly due to
the heterogeneity of price across brands in a given category.
3 Method
To assess the impact of SSB taxation on individual consumption, we develop a three-stage
methodology. First, we use a disaggregation method that allows us to recover individual con-
sumption from individual characteristics and household consumption. Second, we model and
estimate household demand for differentiated products in the non-alcoholic beverage market and
deduce own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. To have a flexible demand model, we opt for
8They report a 236 kcal per day of energy intake from SSBs equivalent to 59 g of sugar per day, that is about
21.5 kg per year.
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a random coefficient logit model (Berry et al., 1995; McFadden and Train, 2000). Third, using
the estimated price elasticities and estimated individual consumption of the different beverages,
we simulate the impact of a tax policy on the individual consumption of beverages and sugar.
3.1 Disaggregation method
Using the household data on at-home consumption, we describe the methodology used to dis-
aggregate household consumption in order to estimate individual consumption. This is done for
seven product categories (four regular SDs, an aggregate diet SD, nectar, and fruit juice). We
first present conditions under which individual consumption can be identified and estimated.
We then explain and justify the specification used for each category.
3.1.1 Identification
Let us assume that for person p in household i the individual consumption ybip of beverage b is
defined by:
ybip = β
b (xip) + u
b
ip, (1)
where xip is a vector of individual characteristics of the person p in household i, β
b(.) is a semi-
parametric function, and ubip is a deviation for this person’s consumption. Then, the household
consumption ybi of beverage b is given by:
ybi =
P (i)∑
p=1
ybip =
P (i)∑
p=1
βb (xip) + ε
b
i , (2)
where εbi =
P (i)∑
p=1
ubip and P (i) is the number of persons in the household i.
Assuming that ∀p, i, t:
E
(
ubip|xi1, .., xiP (i)
)
= 0, (3)
implies that:
E
(
εbi |xi1, .., xiP (i)
)
= 0,
10
allowing us to identify βb consistently.
Assumption (3) implies that βb (xip) can be interpreted as the average consumption of bev-
erage b by an individual with characteristics xip. Finally, u
b
ip is interpreted as the deviation
from the mean consumption of this individual. As shown on Table 1, household consumption in
any beverage b is highly heterogeneous. As βb (xip) represents the average individual consump-
tion of beverage b across the households in our sample, we lose a part of the heterogeneity of
consumption. To deal with this heterogeneity in household consumption, we compute for each
person in a household his estimated share of consumption (using the estimated consumption of
the household defined as the sum of the individual consumption of all persons in the household).
Formally, we have ŷbip = β̂
b (xip) the estimated individual consumption and ŷ
b
i =
P (i)∑
p=1
ŷbip the
estimated household consumption.
ŷbip
ŷbi
is the estimated share of consumption of person p in
household i. We define the individual consumption as y˜bip =
ŷbip
ŷbi
ybi .
3.1.2 Specification
We consider that the consumption of an individual is affected by individual characteristics and
by characteristics of the household (Table 7 in the Annex). The individual characteristics,
namely age, gender, and BMI, are integrated in the disaggregation model. To select which
household characteristics will enter the model of disaggregation for each beverage category, we
first run simple regressions of per-capita household consumption using household characteristics
as explanatory variables (Table 8 in the Annex). In this table, there are two groups of variables.
From the first group of variables (income, education, socio-professional category (SPC), region,
rural area), we select those that are significant for each beverage category which will then be
integrated in the disaggregation model. Variables from the second group (number of females,
number of children <10, number of teenagers, BMI of the family’s head) are included in the
regression to control for their effects but are not incorporated in the disaggregation model, as
age, gender, and BMI are individual characteristics included in the disaggregation model. From
11
the results, the second group of variables are in most cases strongly significant, justifying their
presence as control variables in the regression. Among the first group of variables, that is,
variables that will be used as household characteristics in the disaggregation model, the variable
‘Rural’ is not significant in the case of two product categories, namely iced tea and flavored water.
We thus exclude it in the disaggregation model for the two product categories. With respect to
the region of residence, we exclude it from the disaggregation model for nectar as none of the
region fixed effects has a significant impact. With respect to the SPC, we include the variable
in the model for nectar as several SPCs seem to significantly affect nectar consumption. Finally,
income and education variables are likely to affect consumption, and in some cases both variables
affect per-capita household consumption. Because the two variables are significantly correlated,
to determine which variable to include, we run three alternative disaggregation models for each
beverage category. These models use the following explanatory variables: the variables that were
previously selected alone (model 1), the set of variables included in model 1 plus the income
variable (model 2), and the set of variables included in model 1 plus the education variable
(model 3).9 We then select the best model on the basis of the mean squared error (Table 9 in
the Annex). The level of education is selected in the models for flavored water and for diet SDs.
For all other beverages, the income variable is selected. The list of variables included in the
disaggregation model for each beverage category is summarized in Table 10 (in the Annex).
Because disaggregation models differ slightly across beverage categories, we detail one specific
case (regular cola) and indicate how this specification is modified in the other cases. Thus, we
consider that the consumption of an individual is affected by his own individual characteristics
(gender, age, and BMI status) and by the household characteristics which were selected above.
We consider a semi-parametric function to represent individual consumption. We assume that
the age and gender of the individual and the household characteristics allow us to discretize the
household consumption. In addition, we introduce a multiplicative specification for the individ-
9We do not test a fourth model with both income and education, as we have constraints on the number of
variables that will be finally included in the disaggregation model.
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ual BMI, as in Bonnet et al. (2014). A change in BMI proportionally affects individual consump-
tion. We consider three age categories (x1ip = a with a ∈ [≤ 10; 11− 17;≥ 18] ), gender (x2ip = g
with g ∈ [male; female]), three income levels (x3ip = s with s ∈ [poor; intermediate; rich]), six
regions (x4ip = r with r ∈ [Paris;East;North;West;Center;South]), and two types of area
(x5ip = l with l ∈ [Urban;Rural]). Thus, in the case of the regular cola category, we estimate
individual consumption using the following specification of the function β:
β
(
x1ip, x
2
ip, x
3
ip, x
4
ip, x
5
ip, zip
)
=
3∑
a=1
2∑
g=1
3∑
s=1
6∑
r=1
2∑
l=1
1{x1ip=a,x2ip=g,x3ip=s,x4ip=r,x5ip=l}
βsrlag
[
δg0 + δ
g
(
x1ip
)(zip − za,g
σa,g
)]
, (4)
with δg
(
x1ip
)
= 1{x1ip≤10}δ
g
1 + 1{11<x1ip≤17}δ
g
2 + 1{x1ip≥18}δ
g
3 . zip, za,g, and σa,g are, respectively,
the BMI of person p in household i at the beginning of the year, the mean, and the standard
deviation of the BMI for individuals of age a and gender g. With this specification, the continuous
part of the function β in the BMI is intended to be an age and gender specific linear function
of the standardized BMI by gender and age.10 This specification applies to regular colas, fruit
juice and other SDs. For nectar, the variable region is replaced by the variable SPC. For iced
tea, the variable type of area is excluded. For flavored water, the income variable is replaced by
the education variable and the type of area is omitted. Finally, for diet products, the education
variable replaces the income variable, as summarized in Table 10.
3.2 The demand model: a random coefficient logit model
We use a random coefficient logit model to estimate the demand model for the 60 differentiated
products and related price elasticities. The indirect utility function Vijt for household i buying
10As we consider the BMI at the beginning of the year, that is before purchases occur, we do not encounter a
reverse causality problem between BMI and beverage consumption.
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product j in month t is given by:
Vijt = αipjt + µb(j) +
C∑
c=1
γc(j) + εijt,
where µb(j) is a brand fixed effect that captures the (time-invariant) unobserved brand charac-
teristics, pjt is the price of product j in month t, αi is the marginal disutility of the price for
household i, γc(j) represents the mean taste of the category c(j) over the population, and εijt is
an unobserved individual error term. As households can have a different price disutility, we take
into account unobserved heterogeneity allowing for a random price coefficient: αi = α + σνi,
where α is the mean price disutility, σ measures the deviation to the mean disutility, and νi is
independently distributed as standard normal and captures the unobserved households charac-
teristics.
Rather than consuming one of the considered products, the household can decide to consume
an alternative good, named an outside option, thus allowing substitution between the considered
products and the alternative. In this study, the outside good is non-flavored bottled water. The
utility a household gets when consuming the outside good is normalised to zero. The indirect
utility of choosing the outside good is Vi0t = εi0t.
Assuming that εijt is independently and identically distributed as an extreme value type I
distribution, the market share of product j in month t is given by (Nevo, 2001):
sjt =
∫
Ajt
(
exp(αipjt + µb(j) +
∑C
c=1 γc(j))
1 +
∑Jt
k=1 exp(αipkt + µb(k) +
∑C
c=1 γc(k))
)
dPν(ν), (5)
where Ajt is the set of households that have the highest utility for product j in month t,
Jt the number of products available at month t, and a household is defined by the vector
(νi, εi0t, ..., εiJt). We assume that Pν follows a cumulative normal distribution with mean α and
standard deviation σ.
The random coefficient logit model generates a flexible pattern of substitutions between
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products driven by the different consumer price disutilities αi. Thus, the own- and cross-price
elasticities of the market share sjt are written as:
∂sjt
∂pkt
pkt
sjt
=
 −
pjt
sjt
∫
αisijt(1− sijt) dPν(νi) if j = k
pkt
sjt
∫
αisijtsikt dPν(νi) otherwise.
(6)
The above model is estimated using data purchases for 60 different products. As a conse-
quence, the own- and cross-price elasticities are defined at the product level. We deduce the
own- and cross-price elasticities at the category level ηcc′t as the variation of the market share
of the category c, when the prices of all products belonging to the category c′ increase by 1% at
month t,
ηcc′t =
∂sct
∂pc′t
pc′t
sct
=
∑
j∈c′
ηcjt
with
ηcjt =
∂sct
∂pjt
pjt
sct
=
∑
k∈c
∂skt
∂pjt
pjt
skt
skt
sct
=
∑
k∈c
ηkjt
skt
sct
where ηcjt represents the percentage variation of the market share of category c when the price
of product j increases by 1% at month t.
4 Results
We now detail the results for each step of the analysis. First, we describe the estimated individual
consumption of beverages. We focus on the distribution of the consumption of SSBs which
provide added sugar, of diet soft drinks which do not contain any sugar, and fruit juice which
provides sugar but no added sugar. We also discuss the distribution of the total sugar intake
due to the consumption of all beverages. Second, we provide the results on price elasticities at
the category level. Finally, we discuss the impact of taxing SSBs on individual consumption.
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4.1 Individual consumption of beverages
Figure 1(a-c) presents the distribution of individual consumption of SSBs, diet SDs, and fruit
juice for children, adult women, and adult men who actually consume a positive quantity of
the product.11 There are common features in the consumption of the three groups of bever-
ages. First, adults consume much more than children (because we compare the distribution
of consumption, it means that the consumption of a given decile of adults is larger than the
consumption of the same decile of children). Second, women tend to consume slightly more
than men but the difference is small. Third, consumption tends to increase with BMI. The
only exception is the consumption of fruit juice by children which seems unaffected by BMI.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of differences in the distribution of consumption (Table 11 in
the Annex) and the tests of equality of mean consumption (Table 12 in the Annex) support the
conclusions about the link between BMI and distribution of consumption. In addition, they also
show that the mean consumption of fruit juice does not differ for men and women while it does
for SSBs and diet SDs. Results on distributions also show that there is a large heterogeneity
in the distribution of consumption. Table 2 provides some details about the distribution of
consumption for children, women, and men according to their BMI status. This table shows
that even if the mean or median individual consumption of SSBs is low in France, consumers in
the last decile consume at least twice the average consumption and consumers in the last centile
consume at least four times the average consumption. We find large levels of consumption of
SSBs in every group of consumers. For example, about 5% of normal weight children consume
more than 40 litres per year, 5% of obese men consume more than 128 litres per year and 5% of
obese women consume more than 139 litres per year. Results clearly indicate that consumption
increases with BMI, and this is true for every decile in the distribution.
In order to support the previous conclusions, we present the distribution of the observed
11We present aggregate results for children as there are no significant differences in consumption among the
different classes of children considered in this study (gender distinction, age < 10 or between the ages of 11 and
17).
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Figure 1: Estimated individual consumption of beverages and sugar in beverages
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
consumption of households composed of a single adult (Figure 2 (a-c)). As above, we distinguish
the consumer according to their gender and class of BMI. First, we observe a large heterogeneity
in the level of consumption for a given class of consumers and a given beverage. Second, we
also observe that the consumption of obese people is greater than that of normal weight people.
For overweight people, results are less clear-cut. For example, in the case of SSBs, overweight
women consume more than normal weight women, while results are the contrary for men. As
compared to the estimated distributions, the main difference lies in the level of consumption.
Thus, the observed consumption for single adults is higher than the estimated consumption
for adults of identical gender and class of BMI. There are various possible explanations for
this difference. First, socio-demographic characteristics are different (Table 7). For example,
single households tend to be more urban which has a positive impact on the consumption of
17
Table 2: Distribution of estimated individual consumption of SSBs for different
groups of consumers (litres/year)
Mean Median 75 ptile 90 ptile 95 ptile 99 ptile
Children
Normal weight 13 9 17 29 40 67
Overweight 15 11 20 33 44 79
Obese 19 14 25 39 52 100
Women
Normal weight 42 33 53 82 109 176
Overweight 47 38 62 93 118 179
Obese 54 45 70 103 139 206
Men
Normal weight 40 31 51 78 102 180
Overweight 45 35 57 87 113 189
Obese 50 41 64 98 128 186
Average, median, and centiles computed over consumers who actually consume a positive quantity of the beverages.
beverages. Second, the average consumption per individual in a household decreases with the
size of the household. Finally, it is important to have in mind that for any household the sum
of the estimated consumption for each individual is exactly equal to the observed consumption
of the household. Then, a systematic under (or over) estimate of individual consumption is
not possible. As a consequence, the observed differences in consumption levels are more likely
to be related to the household characteristics of (observed and unobserved) rather than to a
systematic bias in the estimated distribution.
4.2 Individual consumption of sugar
Figure 1(d) provides the distribution of the estimated individual consumption of sugar due
to beverage consumption. Consumption of sugar is computed using the sugar content of each
beverage as defined in Section 2.12 The figure clearly shows that sugar intake increases with BMI
status. This is a consequence of the higher consumption of beverages by overweight or obese
individuals. Tests of means equality reveals that for children, men, and women the average sugar
intake of overweight individuals is significantly greater than that of normal weight individuals
12We compute the consumption of added sugar as well as the consumption of total sugar.
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Figure 2: Observed consumption of beverages and sugar in beverages for one-person
households
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
and significantly lower than that of obese individuals (Table 12 in the Annex). Moreover,
Dunn’s test of stochastic dominance shows that for children and men, the distribution of the
consumption of obese individuals statistically dominates that of overweight individuals and the
distribution of the consumption of overweight individuals statistically dominates that of normal
weight individuals (Table 11 in the Annex). For women, the respective distribution of the
consumption of overweight and obese individuals dominates the distribution of the consumption
of normal weight women. Finally, men and women consume more sugar than children, and men
consume slightly less than women. The total quantity of sugar intake is about 4.7 kg per year
on average for normal weight adults and is greater than 9 kg per year for the last decile (Table
3). In the latter case, this intake corresponds to the calorie intake required for 18 days, that
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is, about 5% of the total calorie intake for a year.13 For obese adults, an individual in the last
decile consumes more than 11 kg sugar per year and an individual in the last centile consumes
more than 20 kg sugar per year.
Table 3: Distribution of estimated individual intake of total sugar for different groups
of consumers (kg/year)
Mean Median 75 ptile 90 ptile 95 ptile 99 ptile
Children
Normal weight 1.59 1.18 2.06 3.28 4.35 7.35
Overweight 1.75 1.31 2.25 3.60 4.57 8.76
Obese 2.10 1.62 2.73 4.26 5.51 10.51
Women
Normal weight 4.77 3.90 6.02 9.04 11.60 18.47
Overweight 5.42 4.59 7.12 10.17 12.57 18.69
Obese 6.13 5.20 7.96 11.26 14.58 21.67
Men
Normal weight 4.66 3.76 5.90 8.77 11.33 19.17
Overweight 5.21 4.30 6.66 9.72 12.47 20.35
Obese 5.88 4.94 7.51 11.16 13.81 19.53
Average, median, and centiles computed over consumers who actually consume a positive quantity of the beverages.
Figure 3 provides the consumption of SSBs, fruit juice, and diet SDs as a function of sugar
intake. Before interpreting the results, it is important to keep in mind that the median per-
capita intake of sugar is about 4 to 5 kg, whereas the graph reports the consumption of beverages
when the sugar intake varies from 0 to about 50 kg. When sugar intake increases, consumption
of the three beverage categories increases (Figure 3(a)). This means that the individuals who
consume more sugar (in beverages) also consume more diet products. However, the consumption
of each beverage does not increase at the same rate. As shown in Figure 3(b), the share of SSBs
increases with the level of sugar intake whereas the share of diet SDs and fruit juice decreases.
This means that a high level of sugar intake comes mainly from a high SSB consumption and
not from a high consumption of fruit juice. This provides some support to target a beverage
tax on SSBs. Moreover, if the objective of the taxation is to limit the consumption of heavy
consumers, then the priority is to target SSBs rather than fruit juice even if the latter contains
13Based on 4 kcal/g sugar and a per day consumption of calories of 2,000 kcal.
20
some sugar. The justification to include (or not) fruit juice in such a tax relies more on the
substitution between beverages that could occur after taxation rather than curbing fruit juice
consumption per se.
Figure 3: Consumption of SSBs, diet SD, and fruit juice in function of sugar con-
sumption
(a) Absolute value (litres per person per year) (b) In proportion (%)
Table 4 provides information about the characteristics of consumers (gender, class of BMI)
as a function of their sugar intake. Because their respective levels of consumption strongly differ,
we provide separate results for children and adults. In Table 4, the column ‘All’ provides the
proportion of different types of consumers in our sample. For example, among children, 85.3%
are of normal weight and among adults, 24.9% are normal weight men.14 The other columns
provide the proportion of consumers for different percentiles of consumption.
An important result is that overweight and obese people are over-represented in the last
percentiles; that is, the proportion of overweight and obese tends to increase with the percentile
class. This is particularly the case for adults. For example, obese men and women represent
4.6% and 5.5% of consumers in the 50th percentile respectively, but 8.4% and 10.5% respectively
in the last percentiles (> 95th percentile). In the case of children it is mainly in the last decile
14As compared to the whole population, in our sample we have a slightly lower rate of overweight and obese
people. According to OBEPI 2012 in France 14.3% and 15.7% of the men and women were obese. In our sample,
we have 11.6% and 12.4% of obese men and women, respectively. For overweight, we have a similar difference.
The share of overweight men and women in France was 38.8% and 26.3% respectively, whereas in our sample it
is 35.5% and 23.3%, respectively. Finally, note that in our sample women are slightly over-represented as they
account for 53% of adults.
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Table 4: Proportion (%) of different types of consumers for different percentiles of
intake of total sugar
All < 50 ptile 50 - 75 ptile 75 - 90 ptile 90 - 95 ptile > 95 ptile
Children
Sugar intake (kg) < 0.85 0.85 - 1.73 1.73 - 2.94 2.94 - 3.95 > 3.95
Normal weight 85.3 85.6 86.3 83.9 82.5 81.4
Overweight 10.6 10.6 10.1 10.8 11.8 12.0
Obese 4.1 3.6 3.7 5.2 5.8 6.6
Adults
Sugar intake (kg) < 3.20 3.20 - 5.64 5.64 - 8.72 8.72 - 11.22 > 11.22
Normal weight men 24.9 27.0 24.6 21.8 19.5 19.7
Overweight men 16.7 15.6 17.2 18.4 17.3 18.1
Obese men 5.4 4.6 5.3 7.1 6.8 8.4
Normal weight women 34.1 36.2 34.3 30.1 28.8 28.9
Overweight women 12.3 11.1 12.5 14.0 16.9 14.4
Obese women 6.6 5.5 5.6 8.5 10.5 10.5
Average, median, and centiles computed over consumers who actually consume a positive quantity of the beverages.
(last two columns) that obese and overweight individuals are over-represented. Whereas the
share of overweight and obese children in the population is 10.6% and 4.1%, the corresponding
share in the last five centiles is 12.0% and 6.6%, respectively. Finally, whatever the age and
gender category, obese consumers are over-represented in the last quartile and under-represented
in the first three quartiles of sugar intake.
4.3 Elasticities
Using household data, we estimate the demand model, controlling for endogeneity (Tables 13
and 14 in the Annex as well as a technical note on endogeneity in the Annex).15 First, the
coefficient of the error term is positive and significant which means that the unobserved part
explaining prices is positively correlated with the choice of the product, thus justifying the need
to control for the endogeneity problem. On average, the price has a significant and negative
impact on utility. Moreover, because the standard deviation is small relative to the average
coefficient, price has a negative impact on utility for almost all consumers. Consumers have
15For computational reasons, we randomly chose 40,000 observations from amongst the 450,000 available. We
used the simulated maximum likelihood method as in Revelt and Train (1998).
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some preferences for fruit juice and other SDs (a positive fixed effect), and have a preference
for regular products as the diet category fixed effect is negative. Brand fixed effects also play
a role.16 For example, even if the cola fixed effect is negative, consumers have a preference for
some specific colas as brand fixed effects are significant and positive for some specific brands.
Using the structural demand estimates, we compute price elasticities for each product and
aggregate them for the seven product categories. We get own-price elasticities for product
categories ranging from -2 to -3 (Table 5). Demands for regular colas, iced tea, and diet products
are the less elastic. Demand for fruit juice, other SDs, and flavored water is slightly more elastic
but in the same order of magnitude. The only category which has a more elastic demand is
nectar (-3.0). Results are consistent with the findings of Dharmasena and Capps (2012) and
Zhen et al. (2014). A recent meta-analysis by Green et al. (2013) reports an average own-price
elasticity for SSBs of -1.3. The aggregate own-price elasticity we get for SSBs as a whole is -1.74
which is in the range of the results cited in the meta-analysis.
Table 5: Own- and cross-price elasticities of demand
Cola FJ Nectars Ice Tea Other SD FW Diet OG
Cola -2.0774 0.2093 0.2156 0.2378 0.2165 0.2242 0.2274 0.6433
FJ 0.7912 -2.1942 0.8523 0.8088 0.7867 0.7564 0.8114 0.6008
Nectar 0.1334 0.1396 -3.0352 0.1360 0.1312 0.1254 0.1370 0.5571
Iced Tea 0.0448 0.0411 0.0427 -2.0017 0.0429 0.0449 0.0455 0.0337
Other SD 0.5276 0.5168 0.5250 0.5386 -2.2545 0.5325 0.5296 0.1226
FW 0.0092 0.0076 0.0087 0.0099 0.0084 -2.2524 0.0093 0.0181
Diet 0.2144 0.2009 0.2102 0.2304 0.2076 0.2154 -2.0185 0.4294
Table 5 also provides cross-price elasticities. For a given category (e.g., colas), the cross-price
elasticities with the other categories of beverages are similar (in the range of 0.21 to 0.24 in the
case of colas). The cross-price elasticity with the outside good is very different. To interpret this
assume that the price of colas increases by 1%, then (own-price) the demand for colas decreases
(by 2% in this case). This decrease in demand is compensated for by an increase in the demand
for all other products including the outside good. Because the values of the cross-price elasticities
16Brand fixed effects are not reported for confidentiality reasons.
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are similar, this means that when consumers choose an alternative product (except the outside
good), they choose the alternative in proportion to its initial market share.
4.4 Impact of taxation on consumption
We evaluate the impact of taxing SSBs on individual consumption. We consider an excise tax
of e0.20/litre which on average represents a 20% increase in the price of regular SDs and 15%
in the price of fruit juice and nectar. However because we consider the different products in
each category, the percent change in the price of different products in a given category is not
identical. For example, the percent change in the price of national brand products is lower
than the percent change in the price of private label products, as the latter products are offered
at a lower price to consumers. In this scenario, SSBs, that is regular SDs and nectar, as well
as fruit juice, are taxed. In other words, beverages containing sugar are taxed, whatever the
origin of the sugar. There is a debate about including fruit juice in a taxation scheme as fruit
juice does not contain added sugar and might be considered as healthy option. Moreover, as
discussed previously, SSBs are the main contributor of sugar for heavy consumers. However,
in this analysis, we include fruit juice in the taxation scheme in order to limit substitutions
between sugary products, whatever the origin of sugar.17
The impact of the tax scenario on consumption is computed using estimated individual
consumption and the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities at the product level (Table 5),
assuming that they apply to all individuals. Retail prices of products are assumed to vary by
the amount of the excise tax. This is a simplification, as some previous work suggests that
the pass-through rate of the tax may differ from 100%. Thus, Bonnet and Re´quillart (2013)
find that retail prices may increase more than the amount of the tax, meaning that producers
and retailers might have some interest in increasing their margins. An ex-post study on the
pass-through rate of an excise tax on non-alcoholic beverages in France estimated an average
17An alternative method of taxation is to design an excise tax on sugary beverages which is function of the
sugar content of the product. In our context, the tax on fruit juice, nectar, and regular colas would be higher
than that on iced tea, other regular SDs and flavored water.
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Table 6: Distribution of variation in estimated individual consumption of total sugar
(kg/year)
Average Median 75 ptile 90 ptile 95 ptile 99 ptile
Children Obesity status
Normal weight -0.239 -0.182 -0.300 -0.474 -0.620 -1.134
Overweight -0.271 -0.203 -0.337 -0.532 -0.680 -1.353
Obese -0.319 -0.243 -0.394 -0.595 -0.768 -2.160
Income
Low -0.338 -0.258 -0.412 -0.636 -0.877 -1.631
Middle -0.217 -0.171 -0.269 -0.422 -0.544 -0.916
High -0.157 -0.079 -0.195 -0.421 -0.609 -1.045
Region
Paris -0.271 -0.225 -0.341 -0.516 -0.646 -1.131
East -0.285 -0.194 -0.349 -0.592 -0.834 -1.425
North -0.321 -0.265 -0.419 -0.601 -0.775 -1.280
West -0.224 -0.174 -0.275 -0.422 -0.546 -0.949
Center West -0.222 -0.171 -0.267 -0.432 -0.565 -0.941
South -0.210 -0.153 -0.252 -0.418 -0.568 -1.050
Women Obesity status
Normal weight -0.836 -0.675 -1.020 -1.510 -1.927 -3.121
Overweight -0.944 -0.787 -1.174 -1.675 -2.082 -3.152
Obese -1.054 -0.882 -1.298 -1.874 -2.351 -3.927
Income
Low -0.941 -0.770 -1.167 -1.694 -2.174 -3.607
Middle -0.899 -0.725 -1.097 -1.604 -2.037 -3.194
High -0.817 -0.644 -1.021 -1.508 -1.878 -3.077
Region
Paris -0.887 -0.739 -1.093 -1.587 -1.980 -3.001
East -0.978 -0.769 -1.210 -1.813 -2.237 -3.944
North -0.953 -0.800 -1.197 -1.667 -2.163 -3.503
West -0.883 -0.727 -1.091 -1.586 -1.997 -2.939
Center West -0.845 -0.666 -1.039 -1.569 -1.973 -3.213
South -0.868 -0.710 -1.076 -1.582 -2.005 -3.129
Men Obesity status
Normal weight -0.791 -0.628 -0.952 -1.449 -1.876 -3.229
Overweight -0.906 -0.738 -1.092 -1.626 -2.084 -3.620
Obese -1.021 -0.835 -1.248 -1.854 -2.466 -4.061
Income
Low -0.638 -0.494 -0.786 -1.192 -1.553 -2.543
Middle -0.881 -0.711 -1.063 -1.590 -2.070 -3.479
High -0.969 -0.781 -1.194 -1.772 -2.235 -3.703
Region
Paris -0.765 -0.610 -0.916 -1.379 -1.817 -2.899
East -0.950 -0.740 -1.160 -1.760 -2.241 -4.039
North -0.949 -0.774 -1.142 -1.680 -2.160 -3.836
West -0.854 -0.684 -1.041 -1.548 -2.010 -3.273
Center West -0.910 -0.738 -1.098 -1.645 -2.190 -3.529
South -0.795 -0.614 -0.970 -1.462 -1.890 -3.262
Average, median, and centiles computed over consumers who consume at least one sugary beverages.
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full shifting of the tax for sodas, a 94% pass-through rate for fruit drinks and a 62% pass-through
rate for flavored water (Berardi et al., 2016). This study also shows that, in the case of colas,
the price of some products did not change whereas the price of some others increased by more
than the amount of the tax.
The average decrease in sugar consumption due to taxation is estimated to be about 240 g
of sugar per year for normal weight children, 790 g for normal weight men and 840 g for normal
weight women (Table 6). We also find that for all three categories of consumers, the average
reduction in sugar consumption increases significantly with the BMI status (Table 12). In
addition, Dunn’s test of stochastic dominance shows that for children and men, the distribution
of the consumption of obese individuals statistically dominates that of overweight individuals
and the distribution of the consumption of overweight individuals statistically dominates that of
normal weight individuals (Table 11 in the Annex). For women, the distribution of consumption
of obese individuals dominates the respective distributions of consumption of normal weight
women and overweight women. Finally, we find that the decrease might be much greater for a
fraction of the population. Thus, for 10% of the adult population, the decrease is greater than
1.45 kg. This quantity is equivalent to a 0.8% decrease in energy intake.18
Household characteristics have an impact on the beverage consumption of individuals. Table
6 shows the distribution of the variation in total sugar intake with respect to income class and
the region of residence of households. Results suggest that, for children, the average reduction of
sugar intake is higher when they are in a low income household than in a high income household.
For adults, the reduction in sugar intake decreases with the income class for women but increases
for men. Differences in the distribution of variation in sugar intake between income classes are
significant.19
Results also suggest that the decrease in sugar intake is greater for children, women, and
men living in the North and East regions of France than those living in all other regions. Tests
18Evaluated assuming a 2,000 kcal intake per day per adult and an energy content of sugar of 4kcal/g.
19Results of tests not shown.
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of distribution show that the differences are significant for the three categories of individuals.
These differences originate at the initial level of consumption as elasticities are estimated for all
households whatever the region of residence.
5 Discussion
This paper contributes to the literature on SSB taxation by addressing the issue of heteroge-
neous consumption and the heterogeneous impact of taxation policies. The main originality
of our approach is the way in which we deal with this heterogeneity. While most papers es-
timate individual consumption by dividing observed household consumption by the size of the
household, in this paper we recover individual consumption by taking into account the many
characteristics of both individuals and households. In particular, we distinguish individuals by
their gender, age category, and BMI status. Then using standard methods we estimate demand
elasticities, and analyze the impact of taxing SSBs on individual consumption.
Thanks to the disaggregation method, we document the heterogeneity of consumption among
consumers. As is the case in quantile based studies (e.g., Gustavsen and Rickertsen, 2013; Etile´
and Sharma, 2015), we find a high level of heterogeneity of consumption. Thus, even if on average
the SSB consumption in France remains low (45 l/year) compared to the average consumption
in some other countries (for example, Han and Powell (2013) report SSB consumption as high as
200 l/year in the US), some consumers experience a very high level of consumption. However, a
more original result is that both for adults and children, SSB consumption increases with BMI
status. In particular we show that whatever the age and gender category, obese consumers are
over-represented in the last quartile of sugar intake (due to beverage consumption) and under-
represented in the first three quartiles of sugar intake. This is an important result in the debate
about the impact of SSB taxation on consumers.
Thus, as discussed in the Introduction, a tax policy would be more effective if consumers
who incur the largest internalities (obese people) are the most impacted by the tax (Griffith
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et al., 2017).20 In this paper, we document the heterogeneity of consumption in relation to the
BMI status but not the heterogeneity in the price responsiveness of different types of consumers.
Results from the literature suggest that heavy consumers are less sensitive to price increase than
low consumers (Finkelstein et al., 2013; Gustavsen and Rickertsen, 2013; Etile´ and Sharma,
2015). However, they also suggest that because the elasticity applies to greater quantities, the
impact of a tax is higher for heavy consumers than for low consumers. If this is the case in this
study, it implies that the tax policy will affect more obese (and overweight) people than normal
weight people.21 In that sense, the tax policy would be effective at targeting consumers who
incur the largest internalities.
The average decrease in sugar intake due to taxation is estimated to be about 790 g for
normal weight men and 840 g for normal weight women. We also find that the decrease might
be much larger for a fraction of the population. Thus, for 10% of the adult population, the
decrease is larger than 1.45 kg which corresponds to a 0.8% decrease in energy intake. To
provide an order of magnitude of the change in energy intake due to taxation on health, we
used an epidemiological model linking a change in nutriment intake to the number of deaths
avoided, using the DIETRON model (Scarborough et al., 2012).22 Based on the average change
in energy intake due to the taxation, the impact on the number of deaths avoided is estimated
at 250 per year, that is about 0.4% of the total number of deaths taken into account in the
DIETRON model. This shows that the potential impact of SSB taxation on health should not
be neglected. This is a rough estimate of the health impact of the tax assuming that the tax only
affects non-alcoholic beverage consumption and has no impact on the remaining food and drink
consumption: an issue which is debatable. Thus, Finkelstein et al. (2013) find that SSB taxation
might generate some substitutions with the consumption of non beverage items, substitutions
which lower the net energy impact of SSB taxation.
20In France, Caby (2016) estimated the social cost of overweight and obese individuals as e360 and e1,300,
respectively.
21Assuming that for a given level of consumption, obese people behave as normal weight people.
22We provide the way in which we used this model in the Annex.
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Our approach obviously has some limitations. First, the disaggregation method we propose
takes into account the individual heterogeneity of consumption due to different individual char-
acteristics (age, gender, BMI), as well as some household heterogeneity. However, there is still
some unexplained heterogeneity. Second, in the context of our model, we cannot address the
issue of the regressivity of the tax, as we do not have information on the food expenditure share
of households. Thus, taxing food consumption is generally considered as regressive (e.g., Allais
et al., 2010). However, the health impact of a policy might in some cases be progressive, that is,
it might have greater impact for low income consumers than high income consumers. Our results
suggest that this is the case for children and women as the decrease in sugar intake is greater for
low income consumers than high income consumers but not for men. Finally, though it is not
yet evaluated, a tax might act as a signaling device (Cornelsen and Smith, 2018). This effect is
ignored in this setting as information issues are not integrated in this framework. However, if
confirmed, this mechanism would reinforce the incentive to promote SSB taxation.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of household characteristics
All households Single households
Income
Modest 15% 20%
Middle 72% 72%
High 13% 8%
Education
Low 29% 28%
Middle 27% 24%
High 44% 48%
Socio-professional category
Farmers 1% 0%
Artisans, merchants and employers 4% 1%
Managers and engineers 12% 11%
Intermediate (foremen, etc.) 18% 19%
Employees 23% 25%
Workers 19% 6%
Retired 21% 31%
Unemployed 4% 7%
Region
Paris 19% 23%
East 9% 8%
North 10% 8%
West 20% 19%
Center West 22% 22%
South 21% 20%
Rural 26% 16%
Nb of women 1.37 (0.88) 0.58 (0.49)
Nb of children
< 10 0.50 (0.84) -
[11;17] 0.25 (0.58)) -
BMI of the
family’s head 24.86 (4.94) 25.20 (4.99))
34
T
ab
le
8:
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
p
e
r-
c
a
p
it
a
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
o
n
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s.
C
o
la
F
ru
it
J
N
e
c
ta
r
Ic
e
d
T
e
a
O
th
e
r
S
D
F
la
v
W
D
ie
t
In
co
m
e
M
id
d
le
-1
.1
0
(0
.6
2)
*
-0
.2
8
(0
.2
4)
0.
73
(0
.3
9)
*
-0
.2
8
(0
.7
0)
1.
02
(0
.3
4)
**
*
0
.9
5
(1
.0
6
)
1
.4
8
(0
.7
9
)*
H
ig
h
-0
.8
6
(0
.8
6)
-0
.6
1
(0
.3
4)
*
1.
24
(0
.5
2)
**
0.
08
(0
.8
6)
1.
89
(0
.4
5)
**
*
2
.4
3
(1
.4
0
)*
1
.0
2
(1
.0
9
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
M
id
d
le
-0
.2
7
(0
.4
8)
-0
.1
0
(0
.2
1)
-0
.6
7
(0
.3
1)
**
0.
01
(0
.4
9)
-0
.4
6
(0
.2
7)
*
-0
.7
2
(0
.8
5
)
-0
.6
8
(0
.6
7
)
H
ig
h
-0
.8
4
(0
.4
7)
*
-0
.2
3
(0
.2
0)
-0
.6
6
(0
.3
0)
**
0.
41
(0
.4
9)
-0
.7
2
(0
.2
6)
**
*
-0
.7
7
(0
.8
2
)
-0
.6
3
(0
.6
5
)
S
o
ci
o-
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
ca
te
go
ry
A
rt
is
an
s
-1
.6
0
(2
.0
3)
-1
.6
3
(0
.9
2)
*
-2
.9
9
(1
.4
1)
**
1.
43
(2
.1
9)
-0
.2
4
(1
.1
5)
2
.9
7
(4
.2
0
)
-0
.7
0
(3
.1
1
)
M
an
ag
er
s
-1
.3
2
(1
.8
8)
-0
.7
1
(0
.8
5)
-2
.4
7
(1
.3
2)
*
-1
.1
4
(2
.0
5)
0.
26
(1
.0
6)
5
.4
7
(3
.9
6
)
1
.7
6
(2
.9
1
)
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
-0
.7
3
(1
.8
3)
-0
.5
4
(0
.8
3)
-1
.7
1
(1
.3
0)
0.
54
(2
.0
0)
0.
76
(1
.0
3)
5
.7
7
(3
.9
0
)
3
.4
0
(2
.8
6
)
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
0.
54
(1
.8
2)
-0
.4
0
(0
.8
3)
-1
.4
0
(1
.2
9)
1.
01
(1
.9
8)
1.
13
(1
.0
3)
4
.8
7
(3
.8
8
)
1
.5
1
(2
.8
5
)
W
or
ke
rs
0.
04
(1
.8
1)
-0
.3
6
(0
.8
3)
-1
.5
9
(1
.2
9)
1.
29
(1
.9
7)
0.
85
(1
.0
3)
5
.3
5
(3
.8
7
)
1
.7
9
(2
.8
5
)
R
et
ir
ed
-3
.0
9
(1
.8
4)
*
-0
.5
8
(0
.8
3)
-2
.3
3
(1
.3
0)
*
-0
.1
7
(2
.0
1)
0.
67
(1
.0
4)
6
.7
0
(3
.9
1
)*
0
.1
1
(2
.8
7
)
U
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
-2
.0
3
(2
.0
9)
-1
.0
7
(0
.9
3)
-0
.1
9
(1
.4
5)
3.
62
(2
.2
4)
0.
17
(1
.1
8)
5
.9
6
(4
.3
5
)
-0
.6
8
(3
.1
9
)
R
eg
io
n
E
as
t
3.
37
(0
.7
3)
**
*
1.
15
(0
.3
1)
**
*
0.
66
(0
.4
7)
1.
14
(0
.7
3)
1.
43
(0
.4
1)
**
*
2
.2
5
(1
.2
6
)*
2
.4
3
(0
.9
7
)*
*
*
N
or
th
3.
07
(0
.7
0)
**
*
1.
46
(0
.3
0)
**
*
0.
72
(0
.4
5)
3.
14
(0
.7
2)
**
*
2.
04
(0
.3
9)
**
*
2
.3
3
(1
.1
7
)*
*
4
.6
3
(0
.9
3
)*
*
*
W
es
t
-0
.0
3
(0
.6
1)
1.
43
(0
.2
6)
**
*
0.
50
(0
.3
8)
0.
37
(0
.6
8)
-0
.1
0
(0
.3
4)
-0
.1
7
(1
.1
1
)
-1
.9
0
(0
.8
3
)*
*
C
en
te
r
W
es
t
0.
23
(0
.5
9)
0.
83
(0
.2
5)
**
*
-0
.0
2(
0.
36
6)
0.
80
(0
.6
2)
0.
48
(0
.3
3)
0
.1
1
(1
.0
3
)
-1
.6
8
(0
.7
9
)*
*
S
ou
th
-1
.1
0
(0
.6
0)
*
0.
32
(0
.2
5)
-0
.1
7
(0
.3
7)
-0
.0
8
(0
.6
4)
-0
.4
6
(0
.3
3)
1
.6
2
(1
.0
5
)
-2
.3
9
(0
.7
9
)*
*
*
R
u
ra
l
0.
98
(0
.4
2)
**
1.
05
(0
.1
8)
**
*
0.
58
(0
.2
7)
**
0.
05
(0
.4
4)
0.
95
(0
.2
3)
**
*
0
.8
0
(0
.7
4
)
1
.5
4
(0
.5
9
)*
*
*
N
b
of
fe
m
al
e
-1
.0
8
(0
.3
0)
**
*
-0
.7
8
(0
.1
3)
**
*
-0
.7
0
(0
.1
9)
**
*
-0
.5
9
(0
.3
0)
**
-0
.4
4
(0
.1
7)
**
*
-0
.3
3
(0
.5
0
)
-0
.5
8
(0
.4
1
)
N
b
of
ch
il
d
re
n
<
10
1.
61
(0
.3
1)
**
*
1.
49
(0
.1
4)
**
*
1.
50
(0
.2
0)
**
*
1.
35
(0
.3
1)
**
*
1.
78
(0
.1
8)
**
*
1
.1
3
(0
.5
4
)*
*
2
.1
7
(0
.4
4
)*
*
*
[1
1;
17
]
1.
93
(0
.3
9)
**
*
2.
51
(0
.1
8)
**
*
2.
68
(0
.2
5)
**
*
1.
87
(0
.3
8)
**
*
2.
43
(0
.2
2)
**
*
1
.9
5
(0
.6
9
)*
*
*
3
.4
6
(0
.5
5
)*
*
*
B
M
I
of
th
e
0.
22
(0
.0
3)
**
*
0.
13
(0
.0
1)
**
*
0.
11
(0
.0
2)
**
*
0.
09
(0
.0
3)
**
0.
12
(0
.0
2)
**
*
0
.0
4
(0
.0
6
)
0
.3
9
(0
.0
5
)*
*
*
fa
m
il
y
’s
h
ea
d
C
on
st
an
t
37
.6
6
(2
.2
0)
**
*
22
.7
4
(0
.9
8)
**
*
23
.2
6
(1
.5
2)
**
*
27
.0
3
(2
.3
9)
**
*
23
.2
9
(1
.2
5)
**
*
2
3
.8
7
(4
.4
4
)*
*
*
3
6
.7
8
(3
.3
2
)*
*
*
T
h
e
in
c
o
m
e
o
f
re
fe
re
n
c
e
is
‘l
o
w
’,
th
e
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
le
v
e
l
o
f
re
fe
re
n
c
e
is
‘l
o
w
’,
th
e
S
P
C
o
f
re
fe
re
n
c
e
is
‘f
a
rm
e
rs
’;
th
e
re
g
io
n
o
f
re
fe
re
n
c
e
is
P
a
ri
s.
35
Table 9: Mean squared error of disaggregation models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cola 2212 2173 2177
FJ 548 536 538
Nectar 770 754 761
Iced Tea 1037 1021 1022
Other SD 612 603 604
FW 1360 1330 1301
Diet 3128 3028 2991
Model 1 does not consider income and education variables.
Model 2 considers only income variable.
Model 3 considers only education variable.
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Table 10: Household variables included in the disaggregation model
Cola FJ Nectar Iced tea Other SD FW Diet
Income x x x x x
Education x x
SPC x
Region x x x x x x
Rural x x x x x
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Table 11: P value of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distri-
bution functions
Regular Diet Fruit Added sugar Total sugar Variation of sugar
SSBs soft drinks Juice intake intake intake (due to a tax)
Children
Normal-Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.02*
Overweight-Obese 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.00 0.00* 0.01*
Normal-Obese 0.00* 0.00*
Women
Normal-Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Overweight-Obese 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.01*
Normal-Obese 0.00* 0.00*
Men
Normal-Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00*
Overweight-Obese 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00*
Normal-Obese 0.00* 0.00*
H0: both samples come from a population with the same distribution; p < 0.05 rejects H0.
* means that the second distribution statistically dominates the first one. We use the Dunn’s pairwise comparison test of distribution
*and the p-value is always 0.00, after controlling graphically that the two cumulative distributions do not cross (graphs available upon request).
We perform the Dunn’s test for total sugar intake and for variation of sugar intake. In two cases (Total sugar intake, women overweight vs obese,
and variation of sugar intake, women normal vs overweight), the cumulative distribution functions cross. In this case
the Dunn’s test cannot be interpreted as a stochastic dominance even if the two distribution are statistically different.
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Table 12: p value of the means test for equality of mean consumption
Regular Diet Fruit Added sugar Total sugar Variation of sugar
SSBs soft drinks juices intake intake intake (due to a tax)
Children
Normal-Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.01
Overweight-Obese 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01
Women
Normal-Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overweight-Obese 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Men
Normal-Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overweight-Obese 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Men versus Women 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.02 0.01
H0: both samples come from a population with the same mean; p < 0.05 rejects H0.
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Table 13: Results of the random coefficients logit model
Coefficients Mean Standard Deviation
Price -2.5458 (0.0001)*** -0.3771 (0.0001)***
Error term 1.8644 (0.0001)***
Diet -1.1212 (0.0000)***
FW -0.8670 (0.0001)***
Cola -1.3163 (0.0001)***
Iced tea -1.483 (0.0001)***
Other SD 1.229 (0.0002)***
FJ 3.3768 (0.0002)***
Nectars 0.689 (0.0002)
Brand fixed effects Yes
Log-likelihood -274,229
Number of observations 40,000
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** means significant at 1%.
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Table 14: Results of the price equation.
Number of competing products 0.0181 (0.0044)***
Sugar price 0.0019 (0.0000)***
Diet 1.3999 (0.0602)***
Category fixed effects Yes
Brand fixed effects Yes
F test IV (p value) 217.20 (0.00)
R 0.88
Number of observations 4,283
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** means significant at 1%.
Endogeneity of prices The estimation of the demand parameters relies on the assumption
that the prices pjt are independent of the error term εijt. However, assuming εijt = ξjt+ eijt
where ξjt is a product-specific error term varying across periods and eijt is an individual-specific
error term, the independence assumption cannot hold if unobserved factors included in ξjt (and
hence in εijt) are correlated with prices. For example, unobserved promotions, displays, and
advertising of some products are likely to affect both prices and demand. To solve the problem
where omitted product characteristics may be correlated with price, we use a control function
approach as in Petrin and Train (2010). We regress prices on instrumental variables (Wjt) and
the exogenous variables of the demand equation (product fixed effects):
pjt = Wjtγ + θj + ηjt,
where ηjt is an error term that captures the remaining unobserved variation in prices. The
estimated error term η̂jt of the price equation includes some omitted variables such as advertising
variations and promotions that could explain price variations across products and time periods.
Introducing this term in the mean utility of households δjt allows us to capture unobserved
product characteristics varying across time.23 Prices are now uncorrelated with the new product-
23We have δjt = µj − αjpjt + ξjt with αj = αSD(j) + αD(j) + αFW (j).
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specific error term varying across periods (ζjt = ξjt − λη̂jt). We write:
δjt= µj−αpjt+λη̂jt+ζjt,
where λ is the estimated parameter associated with the estimated error term of the first stage.
In practice, we use input price indexes of water and sugar as it is unlikely that input prices
are correlated with unobserved determinants of demand for soft drinks.24
Estimating the health impact
To assess the health impact of changes in sugar intake, we use the DIETRON model which
evaluates the impact of changes in diets on mortality due to diet-related chronic diseases. As ex-
plained by Scarborough et al. (2012): ’the DIETRON model uses age- and sex-specific estimates
of relative risk drawn from meta-analyzes of trials, cohort studies and case-control studies, to
estimate the impact on chronic disease mortality of counterfactual population dietary scenarios’.
Irz et al. (2015), using data from INSERM on total mortality in France from the major diet-
related diseases adapted the DIETRON model to the French situation. The dietary input data
for the health model are intakes of: total energy (MJ/day); fruit (g/day); vegetables (g/day);
fibres (g/day); total fat (% total energy); monounsaturated fatty acids (% total energy); polyun-
saturated fatty acids(% total energy); saturated fatty acids (% total energy); dietary cholesterol
(% total energy); salt (g/day). In our case, only the energy intake is modified (by assumption,
only beverages consumption is impacted by the tax scheme). To have an order of magnitude
of the health impact we used the average change in sugar intake for men and women and we
translate it into a change in energy intake (in %) based on the assumption that the daily intake
for men and women is 2,000 kcal and that the energy content of sugar is 4 kcal per gram.
24These indexes are from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.
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